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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court denied Shelaina Danyell Neimeyer's motion to suppress the drug and
drug paraphernalia evidence derived from the search of a small black container in her vehicle,
determining she consented to the search.

The district court determined the totality of the

circumstances showed Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily consented to officers searching the container, in
light of the officers implying they had probable cause to arrest and search her pursuant to a city
ordinance, Twin Falls City Code § 6-2-6, that she violated. But the State never proved the
existence of the city ordinance.
On appeal, Ms. Neimeyer asserted the district court erred when it denied her motion to
suppress. The district court's legal determination that she violated section 6-2-6 was in error,
because the court's factual findings on the content of section 6-2-6 were clearly erroneous due to
the State's failure to prove its existence. The district court's factual finding that Ms. Neimeyer
voluntarily consented to the search of the container was clearly erroneous, because the officers
implied they had probable cause to arrest and search her, even though section 6-2-6 provided no
legal basis to do so, which helped render her consent involuntary.

Further, the inevitable

discovery doctrine does not save the evidence from exclusion.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued Ms. Neimeyer did not object before the district
court to the court's determination to take judicial notice of the Twin Falls City Code, she did not
argue for fundamental error, and any error was not fundamental. (See Resp. Br., pp.9-12.) The
State also contended that the district court was entitled to take judicial notice of the Twin Falls
City Code. (See Resp. Br., pp.13-17.) Further, the State argued that, even if the district court
erred in taking judicial notice of the ordinance, unobjected-to testimony supported the court's
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conclusion that the ordinance made it a misdemeanor to possess an open container of alcohol in
the passenger compartment of a vehicle.

(See Resp. Br., pp.18-19.) The State additionally

argued that, even if the district court were not entitled to draw any inferences regarding section
6-2-6, the error was harmless. (See Resp. Br., pp.19-23.) Finally, the State contended that
Ms. Neimeyer had not shown that the district court erred by holding, in the alternative, that the
inevitable discovery doctrine applies. (See Resp. Br., pp.23-25.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's arguments on preservation, proper
judicial notice, and harmless error. Contrary to the State's argument, Ms. Neimeyer's assertion
that the district court's factual findings on the content of section 6-2-6 were clearly erroneous is
preserved for appeal, in part because it is an evolution of her position before the district court
that there was no probable cause or voluntary consent to justify the search. The district court
was not entitled to take judicial notice of section 6-2-6, and the State's argument otherwise goes
outside the plain language of LC. § 9-101 and contradicts this Court's rules of statutory
interpretation as outlined in Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889
(2011 ). The State has not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the district
court's error was harmless.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Neimeyer's Appellant's Brie£

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Neimeyer's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Neimeyer's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Ms. Neimeyer asserts the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress. The

district court's legal determination that Ms. Neimeyer violated Twin Falls City Code § 6-2-6 was
in error, because the district court's factual findings on the content of section 6-2-6 were clearly
erroneous due to the State's failure to prove the city ordinance's existence. The district court's
factual finding that Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily consented to the search of the small black
container was clearly erroneous, because the officers implied they had probable cause to arrest
and search her, even though section 6-2-6 provided no legal basis to do so, which helped render
her consent involuntary. Further, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not save the evidence
from exclusion, because the record does not show the officers would have inevitably performed a
valid arrest on Ms. Neimeyer.

Thus, the district court should have granted Ms. Neimeyer's

motion to suppress.

B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Neimeyer's Motion To Suppress

1.

The Legal Determination That Ms. Neimeyer Violated Section 6-2-6 Was In
Error; Additionally, The Factual Finding That Ms. Neimeyer Voluntary
Consented To The Search Of The Container Was Clearly Erroneous, Because The
Officers' Baseless Implication They Could Search Her Helped Render Her
Consent Involuntary

The district court's legal determination that Ms. Neimeyer violated Twin Falls City
Code§ 6-2-6 was in error, because the district court's factual findings on the content of the city
ordinance were clearly erroneous. See State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128 (2010); State v.

Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). The State never proved the existence of section 6-2-6. See
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Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867 (1988). Moreover, the district court's factual finding that

Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily consented to the search of the container was clearly erroneous,
because the officers implied they had probable cause to arrest and search her without actually
having probable cause on this record to do so, which helped render her consent involuntary. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 779-80

(Ct. App. 2006).

2.

Ms. Neimeyer's Assertion That The District Court's Factual Findings On The
Content Of Section 6-2-6 Were Clearly Erroneous Is Preserved For Appeal

Ms. Neimeyer's assertion that the district court's factual findings on the content of
section 6-2-6 were clearly erroneous is preserved for appeal.

The State argues that

Ms. Neimeyer "never objected below to the district court's reliance on the Twin Falls City
Code." (Resp. Br., p.10.) According to the State, "Though the Twin Falls City Code was
obviously an issue at the suppression hearing and [Ms.] Neimeyer did not raise any concerns
about the district court's reliance on it then, she certainly could and should have raised her
concerns about the district court's reliance on it after the district court issued its order denying
her motion to suppress." (Resp. Br., p.10.)
However, Ms. Neimeyer's assertion that the district court's factual findings on the
content of section 6-2-6 were clearly erroneous is preserved for appeal. In appeals from a district
court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress, the appellant may always challenge the factual
findings of the district court as clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Munoz, 149 Idaho at 128.
Further, Ms. Neimeyer's asserted is preserved for appeal because it is an evolution of her
position before the district court that there was no probable cause or voluntary consent to justify
the search. Idaho appellate courts generally "will not consider issues raised for the first time on
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appeal."

State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 (2017) (internal quotation marks

omitted). "Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties
will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
After Garcia-Rodriguez, the Idaho Supreme Court further explained, "We will not hold
that a trial court erred in making a decision or a party's position on an issue that it did not have
the opportunity to address." State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, _ , 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019).
"To be clear, both the issue and the party's position on the issue must be raised before the trial
court for it to be properly preserved for appeal." Id. at_, 439 P.3d at 1271.
But the Gonzalez Court also recognized that, in Ada County Highway District v. Brooke
View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138 (2017), the Court had "held that [the appellant] properly preserved the
issue because only specific arguments had changed, not [the appellant's] issue or position on the
issue." Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at _ , 439 P.3d at 1270 (citing Brooke View, 162 Idaho at 142
n.2). The Gonzalez Court expounded that, in Brooke View, "the district court addressed the legal
issue that [the appellant] appealed and [the appellant] did not change its legal position towards
that distinct issue ... even though the specific legal arguments it used to support its position had
evolved." Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at_, 439 P.3d at 1270. "This was proper and necessary for
[the appellant] to do-during the time of an appeal, parties will ruminate on issues and case law
will be decided that may need to be applied to the specific facts of the case on hand." Id., 439
P.3d at 1270. The Gonzalez Court cautioned, "However, these pragmatic evolutions do not leave
room for a party to raise new substantive issues on appeal or adopt a new position on an issue
that the trial court has not had the opportunity to rule on." Id., 439 P.3d at 1270.
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Ms. Neimeyer's assertion that the district court's factual findings on the content of
section 6-2-6 were clearly erroneous is preserved for appeal, because it is an evolution of her
position before the district court that there was no probable cause or voluntary consent to justify
the search. In her motion to suppress, she asserted the officers' search of the container was
unreasonable, because no probable cause existed for the search.

(See R., pp.39-40.)

She

asserted, "In this case, officers did not have the necessary objective facts that would lead a
reasonable person to believe that the small canister would contain contraband."

(R., p.40.)

Ms. Neimeyer also asserted, "There was no reason to think alcohol would be kept in a small
canister," and "possessing an open container of alcohol in a vehicle is not even a crime when the
vehicle is not on a highway or right of way." (R., p.40.) Thus, she concluded: "In the absence of
probable cause, the search was unreasonable.

All evidence obtained subsequent to the

unreasonable search should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, or, in the alternative, this
case should be dismissed." (R., pp.40-41.)
Moreover, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, Ms. Neimeyer asserted, "There's no
reason to think that alcohol would have been in a container of that nature, and they hadn't taken
any steps to follow up on the containers that they had seen to see if there was anything in them
that would make her in violation of any statute." (Tr., p.27, Ls.12-16.) Ms. Neimeyer asserted
she had not been on a highway, and she had been stationary in the parking lot because she had
been on the phone. (See Tr., p.27, Ls.17-21.) She asserted with respect to voluntary consent:
"And it's very clear from the video that Ms. Neimeyer asked if she had to open it, meaning she
doesn't want to open it. But the response she gets from Officer Thompson indicates to her that
she has to open it, so she does." (See Tr., p.28, Ls.10-14.)
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In sum, Ms. Neimeyer's position before the district court was that there was no probable
cause or voluntary consent to justify the search. In support of that position, she asserted there
was no basis for the officers to believe that a crime had been committed. (See R., p.40; Tr., p.27,
Ls.12-16.) Her assertion on appeal, that the district court's factual findings on the content of
section 6-2-6 were clearly erroneous is an evolution, of her position before the district court. See
Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at _ , 439 P.3d at 1270-71. On appeal, Ms. Neimeyer asserted that,

"Because The State never proved the existence of section 6-2-6, the district court's findings on
the content of the city ordinance were clearly erroneous." (App. Br., p.13.) She also asserted,
"Under the totality of the circumstances here, the district court's factual finding that
Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily consented to the search of the container was clearly erroneous." (App.
Br., p.14.) Ms. Neimeyer asserted that, "On this record, the officers did not have probable cause
to arrest and search Ms. Neimeyer for a violation of section 6-2-6." (App. Br., p.14.) "[T]he
officers did not have probable cause to effectuate an arrest on this record, because the State never
proved the existence of section 6-2-6, and the district court could not, therefore, properly
determine that Ms. Neimeyer violated the city ordinance."

(App. Br., p.15.)

Thus,

Ms. Neimeyer's assertion on appeal is an evolution of the position she took before the district
court, and her assertion is therefore preserved for appellate review. See Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at
_ , 439 P.3d at 1270-71.
In the alternative, even if Ms. Neimeyer's assertion that the district court's factual
findings on the content of section 6-2-6 were clearly erroneous were a new position, the issue is
still preserved because the trial court decided the issue. While the Idaho Supreme Court has held
that "ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first on appeal," an exception to that rule "has
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been applied by this Court when the issue was argued to or decided by the trial court." State v.
Du Valt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998).
Here, the district court quoted from what it stated was Twin Falls City Code § 6-2-6,
despite the State never offering any evidence on the city ordinance. (See R., p.61.) The district
court then determined: "The officers could have arrested the Defendant for having a bottle of
alcohol the seal of which had been broken and which was found in the passenger compartment of
the vehicle, in violation of Twin Falls City Code Section 6-2-6. At that point, the officers could
have conducted a search incident to that arrest." (R., p.62.) The district court determined that
the officers could have performed a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle as part of
that search incident to arrest, and the officer's comment implying the officers had probable cause
to arrest Ms. Neimeyer and conduct a search ''was accurate and did not render the consent of the
Defendant in opening the container invalid." (See R., p.62.) In other words, the district court
made factual findings on the content of section 6-2-6. Thus, because "this issue was directly
addressed by the trial court," this Court may "decide this issue on appeal." See Du Valt, 131
Idaho at 553. Ms. Neimeyer's assertion that the district court's factual findings on the content of
section 6-2-6 were clearly erroneous is preserved for appeal.

3.

The District Court Was Not Entitled To Take Judicial Notice Of Section 6-2-6

The district court was not entitled to take judicial notice of section 6-2-6. The existence
of a city ordinance is a factual question that must be proven to the trier of fact. See Marcher v.
Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 870 (1988); People v. Buchanan, 1 Idaho 681, 684 (1878); LC. § 9101(3). Here, the State never proved the existence of section 6-2-6. (See, e.g., Tr., p.11, L.25 p.12, L. 7.) Further, the district court could not have validly taken judicial notice of section 6-2-6
as a city ordinance. See Marcher, 113 Idaho at 870; Buchanan, 1 Idaho at 684.
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The State, largely based on City of Lewiston v. Frary, 91 Idaho 322 (1966), asserts, "The
district court here properly exercised its discretion to judicially notice the city ordinance." (See
Resp. Br., p.13.) The Idaho Supreme Court in Frary held "that the statutory rule, LC. s 9-101, is
not exclusive and is not one of limitation. Facts within common knowledge are not mentioned in
the statute, yet universally such facts are judicially noticed by the courts." Frary, 91 Idaho at
325. Frary cited State v. Egli, 41 Idaho 422 (1925), where the Court had "relied upon the terms
of the statute ... where facts judicially noticed are listed, and observed that municipal ordinances
are not included therein." Frary, 91 Idaho at 325. In contrast, Frary concluded "that the police
court was required to take judicial notice of the ordinance of the City of Lewiston and that the
district court on trial de novo on appeal properly took judicial notice of the ordinance." Id. at
328. Frary overruled Egli to the extent it was in conflict with the Frary decision. See id.
One problem with the State's reliance on Frary is that Frary precedes Marcher, where
the Court, interpreting section 9-101, held: "Inasmuch as this statute only permits a court to take
judicial notice of legislative acts, it follows that the court may not take judicial notice of city
ordinances or of the various codes adopted under them.

Such matters must be proved."

Marcher, 113 Idaho at 870. To the extent Frary conflicts with Marcher, Marcher would control

as the more recent Idaho Supreme Court opinion. See State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 265
(Ct. App. 2003) (holding that, in the event of a conflict between two opinions, the more recent
opinion controls with respect to any conflict between them).
Further, the State's argument based on Frary not only conflicts with Marcher, but it also
contradicts this Court's rules of statutory construction as outlined in Verska v. Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889 (2011). In Verska, the Idaho Supreme Court held:

"The interpretation of a statute must being with the literal words of the statute; those words must
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be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be construed as a whole.
If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as

written." 151 Idaho at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Verska Court also held, "We
have consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed
intent of the legislature." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "An unambiguous statute
would have only one reasonable interpretation." Id. at 896.
Contrary to that approach, Frary went outside the plain language of section 9-101. In
holding that section 9-101 "is not exclusive and is not one of limitation," Frary depended in part
upon section 9-101 being "the same as" California Code of Civil Procedure, s 1875. See Frary,
91 Idaho at 325. Specifically, Frary quoted a California appellate case interpreting California's
section 1875 and observing, "The subjects of which judicial notice should be taken have been
extended far beyond the strict language of [t]his section by many well-considered decisions." Id.
(quoting Wood v. Kennedy, 3 P.2d 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931)). Of course, the California approach
quoted with approval by Frary is not the proper approach to statutory construction in Idaho.
Rather than extending its interpretation beyond the "strict language" of a statute, "If the statute is
not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." See
Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the State's Frary argument is

in conflict with this Court's rules of statutory construction.
Following section 9-101 's language as written shows that the statute does not allow a
district court to take judicial notice of city ordinances. Section 9-101 provides, "Courts take
judicial notice of the following facts," before listing eight categories of facts so judicially
noticed. Those items include, "Public and private official acts of the legislative, executive and
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judicial departments of this state and of the United States." LC. § 9-101(3). The Marcher
Court's holding that "Inasmuch as this statute only permits a court to take judicial notice of
legislative acts, it follows that the court may not take judicial notice of city ordinances or of the
various codes adopted under them," is consistent with a plain language interpretation of the
statute. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 893; Marcher, 113 Idaho at 870.
If the Legislature had intended the list of categories in section 9-101 to be non-exclusive,

it could have included language denoting that intention. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court
has held, "A list prefaced by the words 'such as' means that 'the legislature clearly meant the list
to be non-exclusive."' State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 81 (2015) (quoting State v. Hart, 135
Idaho 827, 832 (2001)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that statutory language
prefacing a list with "includes, but is not limited to," is "plain language [that] identifies a nonexclusive list .... " See State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 546-47 (2015) (interpreting LC. § 187906(c)); Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 397 (1995) (interpreting LC. § 361604(b)(3)). However, the Legislature did not include any such prefatory language in section 9101, that would denote that the list of categories was non-exclusive.
Outside the State's reliance on Frary, the State's argument on avoiding absurd results is
also contrary to the rules of statutory construction outlined in Verska. The State argues that the
plain language interpretation of section 9-101 advanced by Ms. Neimeyer "would lead to absurd
results." (See Resp. Br., p.17.) But as the Verska Court held, "we have never revised or voided
an unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results
when construed as written, and we do not have the authority to do so." Verska, 151 Idaho at 896.
"If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative,

not judicial." Id. at 893.
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The State's invocation of State v. Doe, 146 Idaho 386 (Ct. App. 2008), is also misplaced.
(See Resp. Br., p.16.) At issue in Doe was whether a magistrate erred by taking judicial notice of

the Caldwell City Code. Doe, 146 Idaho at 387. The Idaho Court of Appeals in Doe held, "the
issue presented is controlled by I.R.E. 201 and we do not need to resort to a definitive
interpretation or application ofl.C. § 9-101." Id. at 388. The Doe Court held, "The existence of
an ordinance that relates to the adjudication of the dispute before the trial court is a question well
suited to the application of I.R.E. 201(b )." However, I.R.E. 201 currently provides, "This rule
governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact." I.R.E. 201(a). "An
adjudicatory fact is: 'A controlling or operative fact, rather than a background fact; a fact that
concerns the parties to a judicial or administrative proceeding and that helps the court or agency
determine how the law applies to those parties. For example, adjudicative facts include those
that the jury weighs."' State v. Lemmons, 158 Idaho 971, 974 (2015) (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 610 (Bryan A. Gamer ed., 7th ed., West 1999)). In contrast, as the Idaho Supreme
Court explained in Marcher, "Section 9-101 of the Idaho Code deals with judicial notice of
legislative facts." Marcher, 113 Idaho at 870. Thus, the Doe Court's decision is contrary to the
current scope of Rule 201.
Additionally, the State contends that the language from Marcher on the scope of section
9-101 is dicta. (See Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) The Doe Court also concluded "that the Court's
discussion in Marcher was dicta and should not be considered as having altered or overruled sub
silentio the rule established by the Court's earlier decision in [Frary]." Doe, 146 Idaho at 389.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held, "If the statement is not necessary to decide the issue
presented to the appellate court, it is considered to be dictum and not controlling." State v.
Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 74 (2013).
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The Doe Court determined Marcher contained dicta because the Marcher Court "did not
cite, discuss or distinguish its earlier decision in [Frary], nor did the Court overtly discount the
greater weight of authority and line of authority relied upon in [Frary] to support the latter's
conclusions that judicial notice may be taken." Doe, 146 Idaho at 388-89. However, as seen
above, the line of authority relied upon in Frary conflicts with the Idaho approach to statutory
construction, by departing from the "strict language" of the statute.
The Doe Court also determined "the Court's decision in Marcher of the requirements for
judicial notice was not necessary for its decision," because "[i]t was not necessary for the Court
to conclude that a trial court may never take judicial notice of a city ordinance in order to hold
that the district court did not err in failing to take judicial notice in that case because the plaintiff
did not first ask the district court to take judicial notice." Doe, 146 Idaho at 389. But even if the
Marcher Court's holding that "the court may not take judicial notice of city ordinances or of the

various codes adopted under them" were not necessary to decide the issue of judicial notice in
that case, that holding was nonetheless based on the Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho's
consonant decision in Buchanan. See Marcher, 113 Idaho at 870; Buchanan, l Idaho at 684.
Neither the Doe Court nor the State have argued that Buchanan's holding, that city ordinances
"must be proved either by the record, or by a certified copy thereof," is also dicta.
The district court here was not entitled to take judicial notice of section 6-2-6. The State
never proved the existence of section 6-2-6.

Despite the State's unavailing arguments, the

district court could not have validly taken judicial notice of section 6-2-6 as a city ordinance.

14

4.

The State Has Not Met Its Burden Of Proving Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That
The District Court's Error Was Harmless

The State has presented two harmless error arguments. The State argues that, even if the
district court erred in taking judicial notice of section 6-2-6, unobjected-to testimony still
supported the district court's conclusion that the ordinance made it a misdemeanor to possess an
open container of alcohol in the passenger compartment of a vehicle. (See Resp. Br., pp.18-19.)
The State additionally argues that, even ifthere were no evidence of section 6-2-6 and the district
court could not take judicial notice of it, the district court nonetheless properly determined that
Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily consented to let the officer view the contents of the container. (See
Resp. Br., pp.19-23.)
The State's harmless error arguments use an incorrect standard. The State contends, "an
'error is harmless if the Court fmds that the result would be the same without the error."' (Resp.
Br., p.17 (quoting State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598 (2013).) That is not the test for harmless
error. Harmless error analysis, as established in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),
instead provides that "where a constitutional violation occurs at trial, and is followed by a
contemporaneous objection, a reversal is necessitated, unless the State 'proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."'
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010) (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).

The Idaho

Supreme Court in Perry held, "In Idaho, the harmless error test established in Chapman is now
applied to all objected-to error." Id.
Under the correct standard for harmless error, the State has not met its burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error in taking judicial notice did not
contribute to the denial of the motion to suppress. The district court here quoted from what it
stated was section 6-2-6, including the penalty provision that stated a violation "is a
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misdemeanor .... " (See R., p.61.) The purported text of the ordinance supported Officer
Thompson's testimony that he suspected a misdemeanor violation of section 6-2-6.
Tr., p.11, L.25 - p.12, L.7.)

(See

Thus, the State has not met its burden of proving beyond a

reasonable doubt that the district court's error in taking judicial notice did not contribute to the
denial of the motion to suppress.
The State has likewise not met its burden of showing that the error was harmless because
the district court would have still determined that Ms. Neimeyer voluntarily consented to the
search of the container. The officers did not have probable cause to effectuate an arrest on this
record, because the State never proved the existence of section 6-2-6, and the district court could
not, therefore, properly determine that Ms. Neimeyer violated the city ordinance. The officers'
baseless implication that they could legally search Ms. Neimeyer helped render her consent to
search involuntary, and the totality of the circumstances indicates that Ms. Neimeyer's consent to
the search of the container was involuntary. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49.
The State argues that Idaho Code § 23-505( 1) provided an alternative basis to arrest
Ms. Neimeyer, and thus "the facts known to the officers ... imply that Officer Thompson's
alleged threat to arrest [Ms.] Neimeyer was not baseless." (See Resp. Br., p.21.) However,
section 23-505(2) generally provides that "[n ]o person in a motor vehicle, while the vehicle is on
a public highway or the right-of-way of a public highway may drink or possess any open
beverage containing" alcohol. As Ms. Neimeyer indicated before the district court, the officers
did not have probable cause to arrest her for a violation of section 23-505, because she had not
been on a highway and was instead stationary in the parking lot. (See Tr., p.27, Ls.12-21.) The
State has not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error in
taking judicial notice did not contribute to the denial of the motion to suppress.
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5.

The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Does Not Save The Evidence From Exclusion,
Because The Record Does Not Show The Officers Would Have Inevitably
Performed A Valid Arrest On Ms. Neimeyer

The inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply to the evidence derived from the
unlawful search of Ms. Neimeyer, because the record does not show the officers would have
inevitably performed a valid arrest and search on Ms. Neimeyer. See State v. Downing, 163
Idaho 26, 31-32 (2017).
The State contends that Ms. Neimeyer has not shown that the district court erred by
holding, in the alternative, that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies. (See Resp. Br., pp.2325.) The State's argument on this point is unremarkable, and no further reply is necessary.
Thus, Ms. Neimeyer would refer the Court to pages 16-19 ofher Appellant's Brief.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant's Brief,
Ms. Neimeyer respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction and order
of probation, and reverse the district court's order denying her motion to suppress.
DATED this 6th day of February, 2020.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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